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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Plaintiff John Doe appeals the District Court’s order dismissing claims against 
Defendant Princeton University arising from a sexual misconduct investigation and Doe’s 
dismissal from the University.  Because Doe has not alleged sufficient facts to support his 
claims, we will affirm.     
I1 
 Doe was a male graduate student at Princeton.  Doe describes himself as 
homosexual, but, while at Princeton, his sexual orientation was not public.  One spring 
semester, Doe met a male undergraduate student (“Student X”).  Doe alleges that Student 
X sexually assaulted him during the following summer and when they returned to 
Princeton in the fall.  After the second assault, “Student X’s friends created a hostile 
environment for John Doe,” “by yelling out a gay slur to him and calling him a liar.”  
Compl. ¶ 84, ECF No. 54-1.  Doe alleged that he “no longer felt welcome at” the 
religious community center both he and Student X frequented.  Compl. ¶ 84. 
 Doe notified Princeton that he was twice sexually assaulted by Student X and that 
Student X’s friends were harassing him.  Student X filed a cross-complaint.  
 Princeton’s Rights, Rules, Responsibilities guide (“RRR”) proscribes sexual 
misconduct and sex discrimination, and outlines the procedures for the investigation and 
discipline for violations.  Pursuant to the RRR, Princeton assembled a panel of 
administrators to investigate Doe’s and Student X’s complaints.  The panel issued a set of 
                                                                
1 Because Doe appeals an order granting a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we accept the well-pleaded facts alleged in his complaint as 
true and recount them here.  Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
3 
charges against each student.  Student X was charged with, among other things, non-
consensual sexual penetration and sexual contact, sexual harassment, and stalking.  Doe 
was charged with sexual harassment, stalking, and retaliation.  Doe claims there was “no 
basis” for the charges against him.  Compl. ¶ 105.  Ultimately, the panel found both 
students “not responsible” for any charges.  Compl. ¶ 122.  Doe’s appeal to a new panel 
was denied.   
 Doe alleges that the panel acted improperly by, among other things, meeting with 
Student X twice before meeting with Doe, not interviewing all of Doe’s witnesses, 
obtaining information about Doe’s previous sexual history, and giving Student X the 
opportunity to “submit new evidence” during the panel’s deliberation phase.  Compl. 
¶ 118. 
 During the panel’s investigation and deliberation, Princeton “banned” Doe “from 
attending” the religious community center, Compl. ¶ 110, but declined to provide Doe 
with a no-contact order against Student X’s friends.  Doe asserts that he felt isolated, 
depressed, and attempted suicide.  Doe contacted clergy and student services 
administrators (including panel members) regarding his suicidal behavior.  None of these 
individuals took any action.     
Doe alleges that the “significant stress and emotional upheaval” from the sexual 
assault “had a negative impact on [his] grades and academic standing.”  Compl. ¶ 144.  
At one point, Doe asked the Graduate School for an extension to take a midterm exam so 
he had time to submit evidence to the panel before it closed its investigation.  The 
4 
Graduate School did not grant the extension request, and his academic advisor provided 
no help.  Princeton, however, offered him a leave of absence.     
In the final semester of his program, Doe concluded that he would be unable to 
meet his degree requirements and requested reenrollment for the following semester.  
Princeton notified Doe that he must maintain a B average in his courses for the spring 
semester to be eligible to enroll for the fall semester.  Doe was unable to maintain a B 
average, and Princeton terminated his enrollment.  Doe alleges that another male student 
in his program received his degree without completing his final semester.    
 Doe sued Princeton for (1) violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, (2) breach of contract, (3) estoppel and reliance, and (4) 
negligence.  The District Court dismissed Doe’s complaint without prejudice under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Doe had failed to allege 
sufficient facts to support his claims.  Doe v. Princeton Univ., No. 17-cv-1614, 2018 WL 
2396685 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2018).  Doe did not amend his complaint and instead appeals.   
II2    
A 
                                                                
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
We exercise plenary review of a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss.  
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011).  We must determine 
whether the complaint, construed “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” 
Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 768 F.3d 284, 
290 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted), “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)), “but 
we disregard rote recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and 
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 We first address Doe’s claim that Princeton violated Title IX.  Title IX provides in 
relevant part: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, . . . be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).  Doe offers three 
theories of liability under Title IX.  Each require him to allege that he faced disparate 
treatment “on the basis of sex.”  Id.; Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 
534-35 (3d Cir. 2018).  To show disparate treatment on the basis of sex, a plaintiff may 
show that similarly situated individuals of the other sex experienced different treatment.  
See Boyertown, 897 F.3d at n.110.  Doe asserts that Princeton is biased against male 
sexual assault complainants and that, had he been a “female victim of sexual assault by a 
male assailant,” the proceedings would have been different.  Compl. ¶ 174.    
 Doe has not pleaded facts showing Princeton treated him differently because of his 
sex.  His allegations that he “would not have been subject to Princeton’s discriminatory 
acts if he were a female victim,” Compl. ¶ 174, and that “Princeton also does not believe 
male students can be victims,” Compl. ¶ 127, are too “generalized” and “conclusory” to 
raise an inference of disparate treatment, Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d 849, 855 
(7th Cir. 2019); Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).  Moreover, Doe 
                                                                
mere conclusory statements,” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 
2012).  A claim “has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court 
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  
Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).  “[W]e may consider documents ‘integral to or explicitly 
referred to in the complaint’ . . . .”  In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
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alleged no facts reflecting that the disciplinary process and results for female victims are 
different from men.  See Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d at 856 (holding that plaintiff’s 
allegations regarding procedural improprieties were insufficient when he never alleged 
that female students did not face those improprieties).3   
Doe also alleges that Princeton has a “history of complaints regarding its 
mishandling of reports of sexual assault” and notes one complaint and four 
investigations.  He does not allege, however, that this “mishandling” involved anti-male 
bias nor did he present factual allegations from which to infer “a pattern of gender-based 
decision-making.”  Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 593 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Doe 
v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 50-52 (2d Cir. 2016).  Moreover, while Doe lists many 
grievances about how the process was conducted and how he was treated, he does not 
plead facts indicating that any of this alleged unfavorable treatment was due to his sex.   
 Doe’s Title IX claim separately fails because he has not alleged facts showing 
Princeton was deliberately indifferent to the alleged sexual harassment.  A Title IX 
deliberate indifference claim requires a plaintiff to show, among other things, (1) sexual 
                                                                
3 Doe contends that his allegations should suffice at the pleading stage and 
requiring him to produce evidence of a comparator is too difficult without discovery.   
He suggests that McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which 
describes the burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims, “provides ‘a 
temporary presumption in plaintiff’s favor reduc[ing] the plaintiff’s pleading burden, so 
that the alleged facts need support only a minimal inference of bias.’” Appellant’s Br. at 
36-37 (quoting Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2016)).  That is an 
incorrect articulation of our pleading standard for discrimination claims.  Rather, the 
pleading must set forth some facts—beyond conclusions—that raise an inference of 
disparate treatment.  See, e.g., Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 791 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (pleading’s factual allegations sufficient when plaintiff alleged her employer 
failed to rehire her despite rehiring six other male employees, two with less seniority).   
7 
harassment that is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to 
deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the 
school,” Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999); and (2) that the 
defendant’s “response to the harassment . . . is clearly unreasonable in light of the known 
circumstances,” id. at 649.  
 Doe’s claim that “Princeton was deliberately indifferent to [Doe’s] complaints of 
sexual assault against Student X,” Compl. ¶ 150, is predicated on his view that there were 
procedural flaws in the investigative process.  The complaint and documents integral to it 
shows that Princeton investigated and adjudicated his claims.  We cannot say that any of 
the alleged flaws rendered Princeton’s response “clearly unreasonable.”  Davis, 526 U.S. 
at 649.   
 Doe’s claim that Princeton was deliberately indifferent to the allegedly hostile 
environment “created” by Student X’s friends also fails.  Compl. ¶¶ 84, 150.  Doe alleges 
that Princeton ignored his request for a no-contact order with Student X’s friends who 
had “harassed [him] on campus by yelling out a gay slur to him and calling him a liar.”  
Compl. ¶ 84.  The students’ alleged “harassment,” however, was not “so severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive” to constitute sexual harassment under Title IX.  
Doe’s allegation that Student X’s friends created a “hostile environment,” Compl. ¶ 84, is 
conclusory, and one instance of being called a slur, while offensive, is neither severe nor 
pervasive.  Davis, 526 U.S. at 653-54 (concluding that multiple months of “repeated acts 
of sexual harassment,” which “included numerous acts of objectively offensive touching” 
and “multiple” victims, constituted “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” 
8 
conduct).  Thus, Doe has not alleged a deliberate indifference claim based on a hostile 
environment.4   
 Doe also alleges that Princeton retaliated against him for filing his complaint 
against Student X by (1) “facilitating Student X’s cross-complaint and/or initiating its 
own charges against [Doe],” Compl. ¶ 107, and (2) failing to provide academic 
accommodations or respond to his psychiatric problems.  A Title IX retaliation claim 
requires a plaintiff to allege that (1) he “engaged in activity protected by Title IX,” (2) he 
“suffered an adverse action,” and (3) “there was a causal connection between the two.”  
Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 564 (3d Cir. 2017).  Doe’s report of 
sexual harassment is protected activity, Connelly, 809 F.3d at 792, but his retaliation 
claim fails on the other elements.  On his first retaliation theory, he has failed to allege 
that he suffered adverse action because of protected activity.  Princeton did not sua 
sponte initiate charges against Doe; rather, Student X filed a cross-complaint.  
Investigating and adjudicating a student’s cross-complaint is not an adverse action.  On 
his second retaliation theory, he has not alleged any “causal connection between” his 
filing of a sexual assault complaint and the alleged failure to provide academic assistance.  
Mercy Catholic, 850 F.3d at 564.  The fact that he had a sexual assault complaint pending 
at the time he requested academic accommodations to prepare evidence for the 
                                                                
4 To the extent the complaint can be read to also allege that Princeton was 
“deliberately indifferent” to Doe’s academic or psychiatric troubles, that allegation 
cannot support a Title IX deliberate indifference claim because a defendant only can be 
liable under Title IX when the institution is deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, 
Davis, 526 U.S. at 649, and not based on indifference to academic or psychiatric 
problems (unless the problems were ignored because of the student’s sex).   
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proceeding does not lead to an inference that the denial of his accommodation request 
was in retaliation for invoking Title IX’s protections.5  Accordingly, the District Court 
correctly dismissed Doe’s Title IX claims. 
B 
 Doe’s breach of contract claim is also without merit.  Doe alleges that Princeton 
breached certain provisions of the RRR.  Under the governing New Jersey law, “the 
relationship between a private university and its students can not be described either in 
pure contract or associational terms,” and the role of the court in reviewing such contract 
claims is limited.  Mittra v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 719 A.2d 693, 696-97 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); see also Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 
A.2d 263, 272 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).  For example, “the role of the courts in 
resolving disputes involving the dismissal of a student for academic reasons [is] limited 
to a determination whether the university complied with its own regulations and whether 
the institution’s decision was supported by the evidence.”  Mittra, 719 A.2d at 697.  
Similarly, for contract claims relating to discipline for misconduct, courts will examine 
whether “the institution violate[d] in some substantial way its rules and regulations.”  Id. 
at 698; see also Doe v. Rider Univ., 3:16-cv-4882, 2018 WL 466225, at *13 (D.N.J. Jan. 
17, 2018). 
                                                                
5 His complaint also fails to state a plausible retaliation theory because Princeton 
offered him an accommodation: a leave of absence.  Given that Princeton tried to 
accommodate him, we cannot infer from the complaint that Princeton’s failure to 
reschedule his midterm was a retaliatory action.   
10 
 The complaint does not allege any “substantial” violation of the RRR.  Mittra, 719 
A.2d at 698.  First, the complaint is devoid of any allegations of misrepresentation, lack 
of candor, or a lack of transparency and thus does not allege Princeton substantially 
violated any promise to “be honest and straightforward in [members’] official dealings 
with University processes, activities, and personnel.”  Compl. ¶ 180.  Second, the 
complaint does not reveal Princeton substantially violated any promise to “protect the 
well-being of the Princeton community,” Compl. ¶ 181, and “allow its community 
members to live in a discrimination- and harassment-free environment,” Compl. ¶ 182, 
because, even if there were procedural flaws in the investigation, Princeton gathered 
evidence about the charges of sexual harassment and provided reasons for its conclusion 
that neither student was responsible for violating the RRR.  Third, the pleading also fails 
to allege Princeton substantially violated any promise to provide “appropriate interim 
measures” during the investigation.  Compl. ¶ 26.  University officials have significant 
discretion when to impose interim measures, and the interim measure Doe requested, a 
no-contact order, was something Princeton does not issue to students.  Finally, as to 
Doe’s claim that Princeton “arbitrarily” required that he maintain a B average, 
universities have significant independence “in dealing with the academic failures, 
transgressions or problems of a student.”  Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 567; see also Mittra, 
719 A.2d at 697-98.  Moreover, Doe has identified no policy preventing Princeton from 
imposing academic requirements for continued enrollment.  See Mittra, 719 A.2d at 698 
11 
(rejecting claim arising from an academic dismissal when there was no indication that the 
school “deviated in some significant way from its published rules”).6   
For these reasons, the District Court correctly dismissed Doe’s breach of contract 
claim.  
C 
Doe’s promissory estoppel claim also is without merit.  Doe alleges that Princeton 
promised, in return for Doe’s acceptance of admission and tuition, that “Princeton would 
not tolerate and, [Doe] would not suffer” sexual assault by another student, unfair 
procedures, or an “arbitrary termination of his enrollment.”  Compl. ¶¶ 196-97.  To state 
a claim for promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, “a clear and 
definite promise.”  Toll Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 944 A.2d 1, 19 (N.J. 
2008).  Doe has not alleged a “clear and definite promise” because the promises he 
identified represent the “general expectation[s]” a student has when attending a 
university.  See E. Orange Bd. of Educ. v. N.J. Sch. Constr. Corp., 963 A.2d 865, 874-75 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (holding that a “general expectation” of benefit is 
insufficient to support a promissory estoppel claim).  Given the aspirational nature of 
each alleged representation, none constitute an enforceable promise that can support a 
promissory estoppel claim.   
D 
                                                                
6 In his brief, Doe argues that Princeton also breached the RRR by failing to take 
prompt action when investigating his complaint and retaliating against him, but he never 
alleged those violations in his complaint and so we do not consider them. 
12 
 The District Court also properly dismissed Doe’s negligence claim because 
Princeton is entitled to charitable immunity.  The New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act 
provides:  
No nonprofit corporation . . . organized exclusively for . . . educational 
purposes . . . shall . . . be liable to respond in damages to any person who 
shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such 
corporation . . . where such person is a beneficiary . . . of the works of such 
nonprofit corporation . . . .   
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-7(a).  “[A]n entity qualifies for charitable immunity when 
it . . . was promoting [religious, charitable, or educational] objectives and [for non-profit] 
purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable 
works.”  O’Connell v. State, 795 A.2d 857, 860 (N.J. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  This “involves two inquiries”: (1) “whether the organization pleading 
the immunity, at the time in question, was engaged in the performance of the objectives it 
was organized to advance,” and (2) “whether the injured party was a direct recipient of 
those good works.”  Green v. Monmouth Univ., 206 A.3d 394, 403 (N.J. 2019) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted).  Under the first inquiry, New Jersey courts 
“have found a broad variety of activities offered by educational institutions to advance 
their educational objectives.”  Id. at 406.  Under the second inquiry, a student “engaging 
in educational pursuits” is “per se a beneficiary” of a university.7  O’Connell, 795 A.2d at 
                                                                
7 A student is a beneficiary even when he or she is not engaging in an activity 
“closely tied to the traditional educational purposes of an institution of learning.”   
Orzech v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 985 A.2d 189, 196 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) 
(student died following alcohol-related accident in a dormitory); Bloom v. Seton Hall 
Univ., 704 A.2d 1334, 1336 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (student fell in an on-
campus pub). 
13 
861 (quoting Graber v. Richard Stockton Coll. of N.J., 713 A.2d 503, 507 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1998)).  
 Doe claims that Princeton was negligent in (1) investigating and adjudicating his 
sexual assault allegations against Student X, and (2) not “provid[ing] resources, guidance 
and intervention regarding [his] suicide attempts.”  Compl. ¶ 204.  On Doe’s first 
negligence theory, Princeton was “engaged in the performance of” its educational 
objectives, Green, 206 A.3d at 403, when it investigated allegations of sexual 
misconduct.  Princeton recognizes the harm of sexual misconduct, and, to further its 
educational mission, Princeton prohibits sexual misconduct within its community, 
investigates the claims, and disciplines violators.  As a student, Doe is a beneficiary of 
these protections and procedures.  Princeton thus is immune from a negligence claim 
arising from its investigation and adjudication of Doe’s sexual assault complaint. 
 Doe’s second negligence theory alleges that Princeton was negligent when 
providing student services.  Doe sought out student services from several Princeton 
officials.  The student services he sought are “activities offered by educational 
institutions to advance their educational objectives,” and students are beneficiaries of 
these services.  Green, 206 A.3d at 406.  Princeton is thus immune from negligence 
claims based on the responses to Doe’s requests for such services. 
 Accordingly, Princeton is entitled to charitable immunity and so his negligence 
claim was properly dismissed. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
